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2018 Leet Symposium: Fiduciary
Duty, Corporate Goals, and
Shareholder Activism
Introduction
Charles R. Korsmo†
The debate over the proper purposes of the public corporation
extends back to the very dawn of modern corporate law. Way back in
1932,1 Columbia Law Professor Adolf Berle and Harvard Law Professor
E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. engaged in a famous debate in the pages of the
Harvard Law Review over what has come to be called corporate social
responsibility. The prior year, Berle had published a now-classic article
analogizing corporate managers to trustees, bound by fiduciary
obligation to use their powers to benefit the shareholders.2 To put it in
modern terms, Berle argued that the sole governing norm of corporate
decision-making is, and ought to be, shareholder wealth maximization.3
In response, Dodd penned an article arguing for a broader
conception of the duties of corporate managers—what would now be
called a stakeholder model of corporate governance.4 Dodd suggested
that the law permitted—and ought to encourage—corporate managers,
as holders of a public charter endowed with great power, to take into
account the interests of “employees, consumers, and the general public,
as well as of the stockholders.”5 He further argued—or perhaps
threatened—that the failure of corporations voluntarily to act in a
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1.

The year 1932 has as good a claim as any to being the birthdate of modern
American corporate law, as it was the year Adolf Berle, Jr. and Gardiner
Means published their foundational text, Adolf Berle, Jr. &
Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property (1932).

2.

A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 Harv. L. Rev.
1049 (1931).

3.

See id. at 1049 (“It is the thesis of this essay that all powers granted to a
corporation or to the management of a corporation . . . are necessarily
and at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the
shareholders as their interest appears.”). An early version of this view was
famously advanced in Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, 170 N.W. 668
(Mich. 1919).

4.

E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
Harv. L. Rev. 1145, 1156 (1932).

5.

Id.
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public-spirited fashion would inevitably lead public opinion to demand
coercive government intervention.6
Berle’s response was caustic.7 Berle expressed his sympathy with
the “dream of a time when corporate administration will be held to a
high degree of required responsibility.”8 Nonetheless, he argued that
granting corporate managers discretion to serve the interests of nonshareholder constituencies would, in practice, simply be giving them
license to favor one constituency above all others: themselves.9 It was,
Berle suggested, naïve in the extreme to expect that weakening the
norm of stockholder wealth maximization would lead to social
responsibility, rather than a managerial kleptocracy.10
The Berle-Dodd debate presaged many—if not most—of the issues
that have constituted the corporate responsibility debate over the
ensuing decades. Does relaxing the norm of shareholder wealth
maximization free corporate managers to take other interests into
account—such as employees, consumers, and the environment? Or does
it merely give managers cover to serve their own self-interest? To what
extent do “social responsibility” and shareholder wealth maximization
really conflict?11 Where they do conflict, is any goal other than
6.

See id. at 1151 (suggesting that “the day may not be far distant when
public opinion will demand a much greater degree of protection to the
worker”); id. at 1153 (forecasting “legal compulsion . . . to keep those who
failed to catch the new spirit up to the standards which their more
enlightened competitors would desire to adopt voluntarily”); id. at 1158–
59 (noting that public benefits not provided by private enterprise instead
“might be undertaken as a public enterprise supported by taxation”).

7.

A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note,
45 Harv. L. Rev. 1365 (1932).

8.

Id. at 1372.

9.

See id. at 1367 (“When the fiduciary obligation of the corporate
management and ‘control’ to stockholders is weakened or eliminated, the
management and ‘control’ become for all practical purposes absolute. The
claims upon the assembled industrial wealth . . . which managements are
likely to enforce (they have no need to urge) are their own.”).

10.

See id. (“Now I submit that you cannot abandon emphasis on ‘the view
that business corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for
their stockholders’ until such time as you are prepared to offer a clear and
reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to someone else.”).

11.

Dodd suggested that “social responsibility” included much that was
compatible with shareholder wealth maximization, but also went beyond
it:
If the social responsibility of business means merely a more
enlightened view as to the ultimate advantage of the stockholderowners, then obviously corporate managers may accept such social
responsibility without any departure from the traditional view
that their function is to seek to obtain the maximum amount of
profits for their shareholders.
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shareholder wealth maximization compatible with the fact that
shareholders alone elect the board of directors?12 As is shown by the
Articles in this issue, these questions are still with us eighty-seven years
later.
And yet, as Professor Lipton notes in her contribution to this
volume, “the theoretical question of the nature of directors’ duties
continues to fascinate.”13 In part, this is due to the rich ironies that
abound in the debate. On the one hand, advocates of corporate social
responsibility—often otherwise suspicious of the motives of big
business—would, in practice, entrust the handling of important social
problems to the tender mercies of the managers of big businesses. On
the other hand, libertarian Milton Friedman famously argued that
businesses should focus exclusively on maximizing profits while
operating within the law, while reserving entirely to the government—
an entity he did not generally hold in high esteem—the role of crafting
rules to promote social welfare.14
In part, the continuing fascination may stem from the recurring
idea that changing circumstances are making a robust notion of
corporate social responsibility more practical than it once may have
been. Perhaps a consumer base increasingly attuned to environmental
and social issues has narrowed the gap between “responsibility” and
shareholder wealth maximization. Perhaps shareholders themselves are
more willing than previously to leave money on the table to pursue
other social ends, provided corporations disclose the information
And yet one need not be unduly credulous to feel that there is
more to this talk of social responsibility on the part of corporation
managers than merely a more intelligent appreciation of what
tends to the ultimate benefit of their stockholders.
Dodd, supra note 4, at 1156–57.
12.

See, e.g., 3 Henry G. Manne, First Lecture, in The Collected Works
of Henry G. Manne: Liberty and Freedom in the Economic
Ordering of Society, 15–16 (Fred S. McChesney & Jonathan R. Macey
eds., 2009) (arguing that “socially responsible” actions that reduce
shareholder wealth will be constrained by shareholder voting and the
market for corporate control).

13.

Ann M. Lipton, What We Talk About When We Talk About Shareholder
Primacy, 69 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 863 (2019).

14.

See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase
its Profits, N.Y. Times Mag. (Sept. 13, 1970). In fairness to Friedman,
he rejects the intrusion of “social responsibility” into the corporate
boardroom—in favor of relegating it to the government—on the grounds
that doing otherwise would inevitably lead to political intrusion into
private enterprise. See id. at 3 (arguing that “the doctrine of ‘social
responsibility’ involves the acceptance of the socialist view that political
mechanisms, not market mechanisms, are the appropriate way to
determine the allocation of scarce resources to alternative uses”).
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necessary for them to do so effectively. Perhaps shareholders are simply
better able to express and enforce their desire for socially responsible
governance via activist funds or the managers of the large index funds
that increasingly dominate markets.15 Perhaps fiduciary duty law has
developed to the point where it can protect shareholders from selfinterested behavior by corporate managers while still allowing those
managers discretion to achieve social goals not obviously linked to
shareholder wealth maximization.
In part, though, the enduring fascination with corporate social
responsibility may simply reflect the profound fundamental issues at
stake. None is more fundamental than that no economic system can
long survive in a free society unless that system benefits—and is
understood to benefit—the bulk of the populace. Writing in the first
half of the twentieth century, both Dodd and Berle had this reality
front of mind.16 We may have occasion to be reminded of it in the first
half of the twenty-first century.
On November 1, 2018, the Case Western Reserve University Law
Review held the 2018 Leet Symposium, bringing together a group of
nationally respected corporate law scholars to explore the current state
of play between traditional shareholder wealth maximization and
modern shareholder environmental and social activism. The Symposium
15.

Larry Fink, the head of BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager, has
been clearest in positioning his fund to appeal to such investors. In his
January 2018 annual letter to companies in which BlackRock invests, he
emphasized that “[t]o prosper over time, every company must not only
deliver financial performance, but also show how it makes a positive
contribution to society. Companies must benefit all of their stakeholders,
including shareholders, employees, customers, and the communities in
which they operate.” Annual Letter from Larry Fink, Chairman & Chief
Exec. Officer, BlackRock, Inc., to Chief Exec. Officers (Jan. 2018),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceoletter [perma.cc/ZKG7-7XDB]; see also Leslie P. Norton, Blackrock’s
Larry Fink: The New Conscience of Wall Street?, Barron’s (June 23,
2018), https://www.barrons.com/articles/in-defense-of-social-purpose1529716548 [http://perma.cc/3ZF3-3BM3].

16.

See, e.g., Dodd, supra note 4, at 1151–52 (noting that belief in the
inevitability of government control of the economy “is no longer confined
to radical opponents of the capitalistic system; it has come to be shared
by many conservatives who believe that capitalism is worth saving but
that it can not permanently survive under modern conditions unless it
treats the economic security of the worker as one of its obligations and is
intelligently directed so as to attain that object”); Berle, supra note 7, at
1368 (“Either you have a system based on individual ownership of
property or you do not. If not—and there are at the moment plenty of
reasons why capitalism does not seem ideal—it becomes necessary to
present a system . . . of law or government, or both, by which
responsibility for control of national wealth and income is so apportioned
and enforced that the community as a whole, or at least the great bulk of
it, is properly taken care of.”).
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also included a panel on the difficult role of in-house corporate counsel
in a world where serving as a zealous advocate for the corporation may
conflict with in-house counsel’s compliance function. This issue contains
Articles that were presented on the occasion, together with the prepared
remarks of the keynote speaker, SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce.
Professor Ann Lipton, a corporate law scholar at Tulane Law
School, asks the fundamental question of whether corporate purpose is
determined by the shareholders themselves, or imposed by the law. If
it is the former, she argues, there is reason to believe that shareholders
would not uniformly choose a corporate purpose of maximizing longterm shareholder wealth, even at the expense of other social goals. If
the latter—and she catalogues several features of positive law that at
the very least presume a purpose of shareholder wealth maximization—
the role of shareholders in corporate governance becomes decidedly
murky. She concludes by suggesting that increasing shareholder
assertiveness may heighten the tension between actual, expressed
shareholder preferences and what the law has long presumed those
preferences to be.17
Professor Claire Hill, a corporate law scholar at the University of
Minnesota Law School, argues that we may be seeing a convergence
between the goals of corporate social responsibility and profit
maximization. She argues that reputational concerns in product, labor,
and financial markets, together with the potential for legal liability for
bad behavior, render the tension between responsible corporate
behavior and profit maximization less acute than it may seem. Professor
Hill uses the example of the #MeToo movement and corporate efforts
to prevent and respond to sexual misconduct to demonstrate that the
line between social responsibility and wealth maximization is often
unclear.18
Andy Green, managing director of economic policy at the Center
for American Progress, also argues that the perceived trade-off between
wealth maximization and social responsibility is overstated. In his
Article, he suggests that environmental, social, and governance issues
often go to the heart of the systemic risks firms face, and that longterm investors would benefit from expanded SEC-mandated disclosure
of information pertinent to such issues.19
In her prepared remarks, SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce—our
keynote speaker—argued against an extension of mandatory disclosure
to matters not directly relevant to financial performance. She pointed
17.

Lipton, supra note 13.

18.

Claire A. Hill, #MeToo and the Convergence of CSR and Profit
Maximization, 69 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 895 (2019).

19.

Andy Green, Making Capital Market Work for Workers, Investors, and
the Public: ESG Disclosure and Corporate Long-Termism, 69 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 909 (2019).

847

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 69·Issue 4·2019
2018 Leet Symposium Introduction

out the difficulty surrounding the definition of “material” information
even in the narrow context of financial information, and the
compounding of that difficulty if disclosure were extended to broader
classes of information. She also emphasized the costs associated with
broader disclosure and the possibility that expanded non-financial
disclosure would interfere with one of the primary purposes of our
capital markets—the efficient allocation of capital to productive
endeavors.20
Professor Sean Griffith, a corporate law scholar at Fordham
University School of Law, comes at the Symposium topic from a
different angle, examining shareholder suits challenging merger
transactions. In particular, Professor Griffith examines how plaintiffs’
lawyers have innovated in the face of case law developments that have
made it more difficult to bring and settle disclosure-based lawsuits in
Delaware, the leading corporate law jurisdiction.21
Finally, this issue contains two Articles on the role of in-house
counsel. In the first, Professors Sally and Hugh Gunz explain the
difficult position of the in-house counsel—a professional bound by
professional rules of ethical conduct, but operating under the authority
of non-professional business managers not similarly bound. They then
explore the interaction between how in-house counsel perceive
themselves and how they ultimately conduct themselves in terms of
ethical decision-making.22 In the second paper, Professor Paula Schaefer
of the University of Tennessee College of Law explores what behavioral
science can tell us about the pressures and biases that may lead inhouse counsel to behave in ways that violate their ethical obligations,
and that may ultimately harm their employers.23
This Symposium would not have been possible without the hard
work and dedication of the editors of the Case Western Reserve Law
Review. Special thanks are due to Editor in Chief Rachel Ippolito and
Executive Symposium Editor Emily Cunningham for their work in
making the Symposium a success. Thank you also to Professors
Jonathan Adler and Cassandra Burke Robertson for their assistance in
organizing this event.

20.

Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Pondering Financial
Reporting: Remarks Before the 2018 Leet Business Law Symposium (Nov.
2, 2018), in 69 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 849 (2019).

21.

Sean J. Griffith, Innovation in Disclosure-Based Shareholder Suits, 69
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 927 (2019).

22.

Hugh Gunz & Sally Gunz, Ethical Challenges in the Role of In-House
Counsel, 69 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 953 (2019).

23.

Paula Schaefer, Behavioral Legal Ethics Lesson for Corporate Counsel,
69 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 975 (2019).
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